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Abstract
We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by 
government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in 
China’s stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government 
control structures and their impact on firm value: (1) how do government agencies 
maintain their control of listed companies; (2) what are the impacts of different 
government control structures on firm value; and (3) are these impacts different in 
local government and central government-controlled ﬁrms? We ﬁnd that the Chinese 
government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned 
enterprises (SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency 
costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized 
from the government to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, decentralization 
improves signiﬁcantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central 
government-controlled ﬁrms. 
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1. Introduction
The paper investigates the nature of ultimate government control structures and 
their impact on ﬁrm value.  The study uses a large dataset that includes all state-owned 
listed companies in China in 2004. The relationship between state ownership and 
ﬁrm performance is the focus of a considerable body of academic research. A number 
of studies which examine the government’s impact on firm performance show that 
government intervention reduces ﬁrm value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Shleifer, 1998; 
Hellman et al., 2000). Another stream of research focuses on the agency problems that 
arise between ﬁrm management and the State (Alchian, 1965; Qian, 1995; La Porta et 
al., 1999). In our study, we consider both agency problems and the political problems 
that arise from government control and examine the impact of ultimate state control 
structures on ﬁrm value. 
According to the “grabbing hand” hypothesis, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
suﬀer from political costs when the government and individual politicians use SOEs 
to serve political objectives that deviate from economic efficiency (Sappington and 
Stiglitz, 1987; Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The ﬁrst stage of China’s 
enterprise reforms (between 1978 and 1993) decentralized certain control rights from 
the government to SOEs to improve ﬁrm eﬃciency.  A number of studies have found 
evidence of subsequently increased productivity and performance (Chen et al., 1988; 
Groves et al., 1994).1 However, many SOEs continued to suﬀer from severe political 
costs due to direct government control. Such control allows politicians to intervene 
in a firm’s operations for political benefit by vesting them formal authority over key 
personnel, investment and labor deployment decisions.
To reduce these political costs, in the second stage of enterprise reform, the State 
shifted its focus from the decentralization of operating rights to that of ownership 
and control.2 The main strategy for accomplishing the latter type of decentralization 
was to establish a modern market system and incorporate SOEs into limited liability 
companies. The government sold a certain proportion of its shares to non-state investors, 
thus separating its role as owner from its role as regulator. Consequently, SOEs suﬀered 
less from political costs. However, agency costs increase when corporate insiders (ie, the 
controlling shareholders or managers who have eﬀective control) obtain more eﬀective 
control rights from the government and pursue private benefits, such as abnormal 
perks, at the expense of ﬁrm value (Qian, 1995). Moreover, the development of private 
business provided these insiders with the opportunity to divert state assets for their own 
private beneﬁt (Qian, 1996).
1 The 14 control rights decentralized were: 1) production; 2) prices of products and services; 3) independent 
sale of products; 4) selection of suppliers; 5) foreign trade; 6) investment; 7) use of reserve funds; 8) disposal 
of assets; 9) decision to operate jointly or merge with other units; 10) hiring and ﬁring workers; 11) personnel 
management decisions; 12) distribution of wages and bonuses; 13) organization of international divisions; and 
14) refusal of prorations. 
2 Privatization is one way to reform SOEs, but is primarily applied to small ﬁrms in China. 
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This setting allows us to examine the trade-off relationship between agency costs 
and political costs. On the one hand, the separation of SOEs from government 
reduces political inﬂuence over operating decisions; on the other hand, it may increase 
agency costs due to weaker corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, what is the 
appropriate level of decentralization remains an open question. Should the Chinese 
government further relax its control of listed companies? Do the resulting increased 
agency costs outweigh the beneﬁts of reduced political control, thus indicating that the 
government should maintain (or reduce) the current level of decentralization? In this 
paper we seek to respond to these questions by examining the relationship between the 
level of decentralization and ﬁrm value using data on the ultimate government control 
structures of Chinese listed companies. 
Three proxies are used for the level of SOE decentralization: (i) the length of the 
control chain as measured by the number of layers between government agencies and the 
listed company; (ii) the identity of the direct controlling shareholder (the shareholder 
in the control chain that directly controls the listed company; and (iii) the divergence 
between cash ﬂow rights and the control rights ultimately held by government agencies. 
Divergence is measured in three ways: ultimate control rights divided by cash flow 
rights, the diﬀerence between control rights and cash ﬂow rights, and a dummy variable 
that equals one if cash ﬂow rights are smaller than control rights and zero if they are 
equal. If further decentralization increases operating efficiency, then we expect our 
decentralization measures to be positively related to ﬁrm value and our direct controlling 
shareholder dummy to be negatively related to that value. 
We ﬁnd that 942 of the listed companies (more than 70%) in China are ultimately 
owned by the State.3 Of these State-owned listed firms, 219 (23%) are ultimately 
controlled by the central government, 674 (72%) by local governments, and the 
remaining 36 (4%) by research institutions or universities.  Complete data were obtained 
for the ultimate government control structures of 889 State-owned ﬁrms under control 
of central or local government agencies.  We ﬁnd that 88% of these ﬁrms are controlled 
by the government through two or three layers and that 64% are directly controlled by 
SSOEs. Government agencies hold an average of 43% of cash ﬂow rights and 46% of 
control rights. Divergence between ultimate control rights and cash ﬂow rights is found 
in 250 (28%) of the sample ﬁrms and is not signiﬁcant. Both the length of the control 
chain and the divergence between control rights and cash ﬂow rights are found to be 
positively related to ﬁrm value, and the ﬁrms that are directly controlled by an SSOE are 
found to perform worse than those that are not. These ﬁndings indicate that ﬁrm value 
increases with further decentralization. 
Finally, based on the intensity of political costs, we separate the entire sample into 
ﬁrms that are ultimately controlled by local governments and those that are ultimately 
3 According to our data, 1,340 ﬁrms disclosed their ultimate control chain in their 2004 annual reports, but 96 
of them failed to provide complete disclosure. 
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controlled by the central government. Due to the conflict of interest between local 
governments and the central government, local governments worry about the possible 
future reallocation of assets by the central government (Qian, 1996). This implies that 
local governments are more likely to intervene in SOEs for short-term goals. Moreover, 
as central government-controlled firms are usually large and often internationally 
recognized, government intervention attracts greater public attention. In addition to 
central State-asset management bureaus that hold shares for the State, these ﬁrms are 
also supervised by a number of central government departments, such as the National 
Audit Office, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce. This multi-
supervision makes it more diﬃcult for politicians from one department to intervene in 
their operations. In comparison with the central government, local governments have 
stronger control over SOEs. With the exception of national laws and regulations, they 
are able to set their own policies. As Fan et al. (2007) show, local governments have a 
strong incentive to impose policies on the ﬁrms under their control, especially when they 
are in ﬁscal diﬃculties. 
As a result, the political costs in local government-controlled ﬁrms may be higher 
than those in their central government-controlled counterparts. Decentralization that 
reduces such costs therefore works better in the former than in the latter. Consistent with 
this argument, our regression results for the local government and central government-
controlled subsamples show that the firm value of the former improved significantly 
with further decentralization, whereas those that were central government controlled 
did not. This ﬁnding implies that local government-controlled ﬁrms should be further 
decentralized to enhance their performance. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we apply the 
methodology used in La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) and extend the 
existing research on ultimate control by the State. We describe the complete control 
chain from government agencies to listed ﬁrms from several perspectives, including the 
length of the chain, the identities of the direct shareholders, and the divergence between 
the cash ﬂow rights and control rights held by the ultimate government agencies. 
Second, we consider both the political and agency costs of ultimate government 
control, whereas most of the previous empirical studies of such control focus on political 
costs alone (Hellman et al., 2000; Xu and Wang, 1999; Alchian, 1965; La Porta et al., 
1999). For example, Fan et al. (2007) apply political intervention theory to explain 
the incentives for local governments to decentralize control over listed companies 
and argue that they do so because of a commitment to less political intervention. In 
addition to political costs, we also consider the changes in the moral hazard problems 
of management under decentralization. Our framework focuses on the economic 
consequences of decentralization. In addition, and unlike prior research, our inclusion of 
all State-owned listed companies controlled by both the central and local governments in 
China allows us to compare the impacts of decentralization between the two. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on SOE reform, particularly those 
in developing countries. In China, the government has generally been hesitant about 
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giving up its control of SOEs, which explains why we found that more than 70% of 
the country’s listed companies are still ultimately controlled by the State. In a market 
with such a substantial degree of State ownership, the way in which ﬁrm eﬃciency can 
be improved within government control is an important question for SOE reform. Our 
ﬁndings show that decentralization improves ﬁrm performance, especially when more 
non-State investors share ownership. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short history 
of SOE reform and the development of the stock market in China. Section 3 reviews the 
relevant literature and analyzes the relationship between ultimate ownership structures 
and ﬁrm value. Section 4 describes the construction of the data, as well as the various 
ultimate government control structures of Chinese listed companies. Section 5 presents 
our empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between these ultimate control structures and 
ﬁrm value, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. SOE Reform and Development of the Stock Market in China 
China’s SOEs were controlled by the central or local governments before the country 
initiated economic reforms in 1978. These reforms aimed at stimulating economic 
development by transforming from a planned economy to a market economy. Before 
the reform, all ﬁrm decisions, including those about employment and production, were 
made by government institutions. Managers and employees had very few operational 
incentives, and politically motivated objectives served to lower ﬁrm eﬃciency. 
The economic reforms began with an expansion of enterprise autonomy and allowed 
3% retainable proﬁts, although the basic central planning institutional framework remained. 
Although the country’s SOEs were now motivated to improve productivity and eﬃciency, 
their managers had the incentive to hide proﬁts from the government or transfer them to other 
companies under their ownership (Qian, 1995). At the same time, government control was 
of limited use in mitigating agency costs, as politicians have less information and operational 
capabilities than do ﬁrm managers. As they are not residual claimants, they lack the incentive 
to monitor managers to ensure that ﬁrm proﬁts are maximized. Instead, they may pursue 
political beneﬁts, such as employing an excess labor force to maintain social stability. 
Therefore, in the second stage of the economic reforms, the government retreated 
from direct enterprise control by combining a socialist market economy with a modern 
corporate system. As in other economies, making the transition from a planned system 
to a market economy, the major task for Chinese enterprise reform is to separate SOEs 
from the government. To facilitate this separation, two Stock Exchanges were set up in 
1990 and 1991, and many large and medium-sized SOEs were then transformed into 
publicly listed ﬁrms.4 According to data on ownership structures in 2004, more than 
4 The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) opened in December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
in April 1991.
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70% of China’s listed companies remained ultimately owned by the State and controlled 
by the central or local governments through the shareholding chain. 
Two typical ultimate control structures for listed ﬁrms are illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2. Although State-owned listed companies remain ultimately controlled by the 
government with the authorization of the State Council, rather than being involved 
in day-to-day aﬀairs as it was previously, the State now serves as the owner. State Asset 
Management Bureaus (SAMBs) at the central and local levels were founded to supervise 
ﬁrm operation and represent the State’s interests. SAMBs control the shares of listed 
companies directly or indirectly through SOEs.5
Figure 1. Ultimate Control Structure of Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (600001)
Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (600001) is a state-owned listed company that is ultimately controlled by the 
Hebei Province State Asset Management Committee. This SAMB controls the listed company through an SSOE, 
Handan Iron & Steel Group Co., Ltd.
Source: The 2004 annual report of Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (600001).
5 According to Article Eight of the Regulation for State-owned Shares in Joint-stock Companies, when an SOE 
is completely transformed into a listed company, or partially transformed, but still includes its core business, 
the State holds shares in it directly through a government agency. These shares are classiﬁed as State shares. 
Alternatively, when only small portions or subsidiaries of an SOE are transformed into a listed company, then 
shares can be classiﬁed as State-owned legal person shares or legal person shares and held by a parent-SOE.
Hebei Province State Asset
Management Committee
Handan Iron & Steel Group Co., Ltd. 
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Figure 2. Ultimate Control Structure of CNFC Overseas Fishery Co., Ltd. (000798)
CNFC Overseas Fishery Co., Ltd. (000798) is a state-owned listed company that is ultimately controlled by the 
State Asset Management Committee, which reports to the State Council. This SAMB controls the listed company 
through three SSOEs: the China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation, the China Aquatic 
Yantai Marine Fisheries Corporation and the China Aquatic Zhoushan Marine Fisheries Corporation.
Source: The 2004 annual report of CNFC Overseas Fishery Co., Ltd. (000798).
3. Ultimate Government Control Structure and Firm Value 
The relationship between ownership structure and ﬁrm value has been researched 
extensively. Since the 1970s, an increasing number of studies have begun to question the 
nature of ownership (Eisenberg, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). La Porta et al. (1999) investigate the ownership structures of large corporations 
in 27 economies and ﬁnd that they are ultimately controlled by families or the State 
through pyramids, cross-shareholdings and superior voting rights. 
The presence of large shareholders has both positive and negative aspects that aﬀect 
ﬁrm valuation. These shareholders have strong incentives and capabilities to monitor 
managers so as to maximize ﬁrm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). However, they possess their own interests, which may not be consistent with 
those of other investors. Thus, the costs of large shareholder control reduce ﬁrm value 
(Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Claessens et al., 2002). 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm value becomes even more 
complicated when the State is the ultimate owner, which is the prevalent situation in 
China. As the State also plays the role of regulator, its interests may conﬂict with ﬁrm 
proﬁtability. For example, Fan et al. (2007) show that a local government that is burdened 
by poor ﬁscal conditions or operates in a region with a high level of unemployment may 
State Asset Management Committee Management Committee
China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation
CNFC Overseas Fishery Co., Ltd. 
(Code: 000798)
China Aquatic Yantai 
Marine Fisheries
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require that the firms it owns subsidize public expenditure or increased employment, 
neither action of which is a value-maximizing objective. In addition, in some cases, it is 
politicians rather than professional managers who represent the government and who 
ultimately control ﬁrms. Groves et al. (1995) ﬁnd that such politicians are not chosen and 
promoted for their management experience or speciﬁc industry knowledge, but rather 
because of their commitment to government policies. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) further 
ﬁnd that politicians may require ﬁrms to serve political interests at the expense of ﬁrm 
eﬃciency. These political costs are deﬁned as the costs experienced by a ﬁrm when it is 
made to serve political objectives that deviate from economic eﬃciency. They arise when 
the State controls ﬁrms more rigorously and have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value (Qian, 
1996; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Boycko et al., 1996). 
Separating business operations from government control can reduce political costs 
because decentralization provides ﬁrms with more decision-making autonomy. However, 
such separation may at the same time increase agency costs, as managers may pursue 
private beneﬁts at the expense of the ﬁrm (Qian, 1995, 1996). According to Aghion 
and Tirole (1997), such agency costs increase as more formal authority is delegated 
to an agent. This increase is also significantly higher in developing markets, which 
are generally characterized by a lack of corporate governance mechanisms. China’s 
market economy has existed for less than 30 years, and its stock market for less than 
20.  The country lacks suﬃcient mechanisms to protect shareholders from management 
shrinkage or entrenchment. Therefore, the agency costs between the State and corporate 
insiders (controlling shareholders or managers who have substantive control over the 
ﬁrm and who may be government bodies or SSOEs) increase with a ﬁrm’s separation 
from government. The net effect of decentralization on firm value in a developing 
economy is thus an open empirical question. If the reduction in political costs following 
decentralization exceeds the incremental agency costs, then ﬁrm value will increase. If, 
instead, agency costs exceed the reduction in political costs, then ﬁrm value will decrease.
This study uses diﬀerent proxies to gauge the extent of decentralization. The ﬁrst 
proxy is the length of the control chain between listed firms and the government. 
As Qian and Stiglitz (1996) report, managerial autonomy is enhanced, and political 
intervention reduced, in companies that maintain their distance from the government 
through a series of organizational transformations.6 Accordingly, we predict that the 
longer the control chain, the fewer political costs for the firm. However, corporate 
insider agency problems, such as tunneling and asset stripping may become worse when 
government control is reduced and lessen ﬁrm value. 
6 Qian and Stiglitz (1996) report several cases of such organizational transformation. Qian (1996) documents 
the following process: “a state-owned enterprise of Beijing ﬁrst sets up a wholly-owned subsidiary in a special 
economic zone of Shenzhen; then the subsidiary enters into a joint venture with domestic and Hong Kong 
partners; later the joint venture sets up another subsidiary in Pudong development zone in Shanghai, and then 
the subsidiary forms another joint venture with a TVE (Tower-village Enterprise) in nearby Wuxi of Jiangsu. 
After several rounds of transformation, eﬀective managerial control expands.”
ULTIMATE GOVERNMENT CONTROL STRUCTURES AND FIRM VALUE:
EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES 109
The second proxy is the identity of the direct controlling shareholder. When this 
shareholder is an SSOE, the State’s control over the listed firm is more rigorous. 
According to China’s Company Law (1993), SSOEs are wholly owned by State-
authorized organizations (institutions or government departments). Such a company’s 
chairman and deputy chairman will be directly appointed by a State-authorized 
organization. Thus, although the ﬁrm’s board of directors may make decisions about 
certain business activities, the most important decisions, including those with regard 
to mergers and acquisitions, dissolution, changes in capital and bond issuance, are 
ultimately made by the State-authorized organization. Accordingly, a listed firm 
immediately held by an SSOE bears higher political costs and lacks the opportunity to 
reduce its size. 
Our third proxy is the divergence between the cash ﬂow and control rights held by 
the ultimate controller and government agencies. Such divergence results from a longer 
control chain and thus represents the level of separation between the business and the 
government (Qian, 1996), particularly when the shareholders in this chain are non-
SSOEs. The degree of divergence is measured in three ways: ultimate control rights 
divided by cash ﬂows rights, the diﬀerence between control rights and cash ﬂow rights, 
and a dummy variable that equals one if cash ﬂow rights are weaker than control rights 
and zero if they are equal. Greater divergence between the two types of rights implies 
lower political costs for the ﬁrm. 
4. Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics
Since 2004, listed companies in China have been required to disclose their complete 
control chain, including their ultimate owner, in their annual reports. This requirement 
provides us with an opportunity to investigate in detail the relationship between the 
ultimate control structure and firm value and, using the aforementioned proxies, to 
determine the appropriate level of separation between ﬁrm and government. 
Control chain data were manually collected from the 2004 annual reports of all listed 
ﬁrms in China. Other ﬁnancial and stock market data were obtained from Tsinghua 
University’s Center for China Finance Research (CCFR) database. The deﬁnitions of all 
variables used in this paper are explained in Table 1. 
Table 1. Deﬁnitions of Variables
Variable Description
SSOE Equals one if the direct controlling shareholder is an SSOE or government bureau
LAYER Measured by the number of ownership layers connecting listed companies to government agencies
OC1 Ln (ultimate control rights/ultimate cash ﬂow rights) 
OC2 Ultimate control rights minus (-) ultimate cash ﬂow rights
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Variable Description
OC3 Dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate cash ﬂow rights are less than the control rights and zero otherwise 
BLOCK Dummy variable that equals one if there is more than one large shareholder and zero otherwise 
H3 Square root of total squared ownership of the three largest shareholders
Current Current assets/Current liabilities
Leverage Total liabilities/Total assets
Accounts receivable turnover Sales/Year-end accounts receivables
Inventory turnover COGS/Year-end inventory
Total assets turnover Sales/Total assets
Proﬁt margin from core business (Net sales - COGS - operating taxes - operating expenses - management expenses - ﬁnancial expenses)/Net sales
Net proﬁt margin Net income/Net sales
ROA Net income/Year-end total assets
CROA (Net sales - COGS - operating taxes - operating expense - management expenses - ﬁnancial expenses)/Year-end total assets
CFROA Cash from operations/Year-end total assets
ROE Net income/Year-end equity
CROE (Net sales - COGS - operating taxes - operating expenses - management expenses - ﬁnancial expenses)/Year-end equity
CFROE Cash from operations/Year-end equity
MB Market price/Book value of equity per share
Tobin’s Q1 (Book value of liability + Market price × Total shares outstanding)/Book value of total assets
Tobin’s Q2 (Book value of liability + Market price × Tradable shares outstanding + Book value of equity per share × Non-tradable shares outstanding)/Book value of total assets
Age Number of years from the IPO year to 2004
Size Natural log of total assets
As shown in Table 2, out of all 1,340 listed companies in 2004, we identify 889 
ﬁrms as our sample ﬁrms, which provide complete layer information on how they are 
ultimately controlled by government agencies.7 The industry distribution of sample 
7 Among all 1,340 listed ﬁrms that provide annual report, 96 ﬁrms do not provide clear information of their ultimate 
controller; 302 ﬁrms are ultimately controlled by persons (which is deﬁned as privately-owned ﬁrms). The remained 
942 are classiﬁed as state-owned listed companies whose ultimate controllers are government agencies, including local 
and central government bureaus or state assets management bureaus, and research institutions and other organizations. 
To focus on government’s intervention, we exclude 49 ﬁrms ultimately controlled by research institutions and other 
organizations. Among the remained 893 ﬁrms that are deﬁned as state-owned listed companies with government 
agencies as ultimately controllers, 889 provide complete layer information and indentiﬁed as our sample ﬁrms. 
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firms is consistent with that of all listed companies. In particular, we exclude firms 
from ﬁnancial industry. Government control 66% of listed companies according to our 
sample. In particular, government control varies by industry in China. In such industries 
as IT, Publishing and Diversified, there are relatively less state-owned firms. In the 
mining, utility and transportation sectors, in contrast, most ﬁrms (more than 80%) are 
ultimately controlled by government. 
Table 2. Industry Distribution of Sample Firms
Firms that disclose control 
chain information
Sample ﬁrms ultimately 
controlled by 
governmenta 
% of sample ﬁrms over all 
listed companies 
Number of Observations 1340 889 66%
Agriculture 37 21 57%
Mining 25 21 84%
Manufacturing 764 528 69%
Utilities 56 51 91%
Construction 28 19 68%
Transportation 56 47 84%
IT 84 39 46%
Wholesale 96 68 71%
Finance 10 0 0%
Real estate 48 30 63%
Services 40 31 78%
Publishing 11 3 27%
Diversiﬁed 85 31 36%
a Among all Chinese listed companies whose ultimate controllers are government agencies, our sample includes 889 of 
them, which provide information of layer.
We investigate four characteristics of the ultimate control chain: ultimate owner, 
control chain length, identity of the direct controlling shareholder, and the degree 
of divergence between the ultimate cash flow rights and control rights held by the 
government.
As previously noted, in our deﬁnition, the ultimate controller must be a government 
department.8 In some instances, although we were able to identify the control chain 
from the listed company to the government, we were unable to find shareholding 
information for the intermediate level of the chain. In these cases, ultimate cash ﬂow 
8 When a ﬁrm discloses that its ultimate owner is another company, then we trace the chain to the upper level, 
that is, the government level; otherwise, this ﬁrm is put into the group for which the ultimate owner cannot be 
identiﬁed.
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and control rights data were unavailable. Therefore, the number of observations for our 
analysis of ultimate owners and the number of control layers is larger than that for our 
analysis of the identity of the direct controlling shareholders and the divergence between 
the cash ﬂow and control rights ultimately held by the government. 
When calculating the length of the control chain, we identify the chain(s) that 
connects the largest ultimate owner and the company in question and count the number 
of layers it contains. When the ultimate owner has several control chains through which 
to control the listed ﬁrm, the number of layers is determined by those in which the 
ultimate owner has the most voting rights.
In line with Claessens et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999), our definition of 
ownership relies on cash-flow rights and our definition of control on voting rights; 
that is, ownership is equal to the product of the ownership stakes along the control 
chain, whereas control rights are the weakest link in the chain of voting rights. When 
an ultimate owner has several control chains through which to control the votes in a 
company, we trace those chains individually and then sum up the control (cash ﬂow) 
rights to yield the ultimate control (cash ﬂow) share.
4.1. Who Controls China’s Listed ﬁrms?  
Of the 889 government-controlled ﬁrms in our ﬁnal sample (Table 2), 509 (57% of 
government-controlled ﬁrms) are controlled by local SAMBs. The second largest group 
of ﬁrms includes the 197 that are controlled by a central SAMB. These ﬁrms represent 
22.1% of all government-controlled firms. These figures show that since the SOE 
reforms, both the central and local governments control listed ﬁrms primarily through 
SAMBs. The other firms in our final sample include 161 controlled by other local 
government bureaus (18.3% of government-controlled ﬁrms) and 22 controlled by other 
central government bureaus (2.5% of government-controlled ﬁrms).  
4.2. How Does the Government Control Listed Companies? 
Table 3 presents the ownership characteristics of government-controlled SOEs. The 
government controls 84% of companies through an SSOE at the second level of the 
control chain. This percentage is even higher (around 95%) for central government-
controlled ﬁrms. 64% of sample ﬁrms and even more of the ﬁrms controlled by local 
governments, also have an SSOE as their direct controlling shareholder. 
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Table 3. Control Structure of State-Controlled Listed Companiesa











Number of Observations 889 197 22 509 161
% of ﬁrms with SSOE at the second to top layer 84.40 96.95 95.45 81.14 77.91
% of ﬁrms with SSOE as the largest shareholder 64.19 54.31 45.45 68.70 64.60
Mean of layer 2.33 2.81 2.59 2.17 2.25
Number of
Firms with
1 layer 56 0 0 46 10
2 layers 543 75 11 348 109
3 layers 241 94 9 102 36
4 layers 38 21 2 11 4
5 layers 8 4 0 2 2
6 layers 3 3 0 0 0
Mean of Ultimate ownership (%) 42.56 42.86 30.65 42.72 43.30
Mean of Ultimate control (%) 46.09 48.09 38.68 45.60 46.12
Mean of OC1 0.1231 0.1902 0.3618 0.0932 0.0964
Mean of OC2 (%) 3.52 5.23 8.03% 2.88 2.82%
Mean of OC3 (%) 27.83 39.59 54.55 22.00 28.82
Mean largest shareholding (%) 46.02 49.06 38.63 45.43 45.21
Mean of H3 (%) 48.46 51.56 42.77 47.74 47.76
a Deﬁnitions of the variables are given in Table 1.
With regard to the length of the ultimate control chain, it can be seen from Table 3 
that, on average, there are 2.33 layers between the ultimate owner and the listed ﬁrm. In 
56 of the ﬁrms in our sample, there is only one layer between the two, and in three ﬁrms 
there are six. The numbers of layers in SAMB- and other government bureau-controlled 
ﬁrms are similar (2.17 and 2.25, respectively), but central government-controlled ﬁrms 
tend to have longer control chains, an average of 2.81 and 2.59 layers, respectively, in 
those controlled by SAMBs and other government bureaus. The possible reason for this 
is that central government-controlled ﬁrms are larger. As a result, the common practice 
is for the subsidiaries in the group, rather than the group itself, to go public. 
The degree of divergence between ownership and government control is also shown 
in Table 3, from which it can be seen that, on average, ultimate controllers own 42.6% 
of the cash ﬂow rights in listed ﬁrms. Central SAMBs and local government bureaus 
other than SAMBs have greater cash flow rights. The mean control rights held by 
ultimate owners are 46.1%, with central SAMBs enjoying the greatest percentage. 
During the data collection process, we noted that cross-holdings are rare in government-
controlled firms. Furthermore, although there are a number of layers in the control 
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chain, the degree of divergence between ownership and government control is 
unremarkable, which implies that the state’s intention was probably not to establish 
pyramidal structures. The mean diﬀerence between the ultimate owner’s control rights 
and cash ﬂow rights in our sample of listed ﬁrms is 3.5%, with the degree of divergence 
the least in ﬁrms controlled by local governments. This ﬁnding demonstrates that there 
is still little separation between government and SOEs, particularly those controlled 
by local governments. Consistent with our supposition that the degree of divergence 
between ownership and control is a good proxy for such separation, we ﬁnd that in a 
large percentage of our sample there is no diﬀerence between ultimate ownership and 
control rights. Only 27.8% of the ﬁrms have greater ultimate control rights than cash 
ﬂow rights, with the central government tending to delegate more rights to enterprises.
Finally, Table 3 also shows that among our sample firms, the direct controlling 
shareholder holds an average of 46% of shares, with the largest shareholders under 
central SAMB control owning a greater number. This may be because central SAMB-
controlled ﬁrms are larger. The mean Herﬁndahl index of the three largest shareholders 
is 48.5%. 
 4.3. To What Extent is the Government the Only Large Shareholder?









Whole sample 92.13 42.07 93.64 43.04
Group 1 94.42 45.24 94.92 51.78
Group 2 93.64 31.82 86.36 31.82
Group 3 43.04 42.04 93.12 42.44
Group 4 92.64 39.26 96.32 41.10
Group 5 86.11 26.22 86.11 19.44
Agriculture 95.45 45.45 90.91 36.36
Mining 100.00 80.95 100.00 80.95
Manufacturing 92.74 45.07 95.16 46.55
Utilities 92.16 39.22 92.16 39.22
Construction 100.00 47.37 100.00 52.63
Transportation 97.92 50.00 97.92 52.08
IT 90.00 32.00 92.00 36.00
Wholesale 88.24 32.35 88.24 29.41
Real estate 87.10 29.03 90.32 29.03
Service 96.77 35.48 100.00 35.48
Publishing 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
Diversiﬁed 76.32 18.42 76.32 21.05
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a  This table reports the probability that the government has sole control in the whole sample, diﬀerent sub-samples 
and diﬀerent industries. Four criteria are used to determine whether the government has sole control: control rights 
of the ultimate owner > 20%, control rights of the ultimate owner > 50%, largest shareholding > 20% and largest 
shareholding > 50%. Group 1 includes ﬁrms with a central SAMB as the ultimate owner. Group 2 includes ﬁrms 
with a central government bureau as the ultimate owner. Group 3 includes ﬁrms with a local SAMB as the ultimate 
owner. Group 4 includes ﬁrms with a local government bureau as the ultimate owner. Group 5 includes ﬁrms with 
universities or research institutions as the ultimate owner.
Table 4 shows the percentage of ﬁrms in which the government is the only large 
shareholder. We use four criteria to determine the level of government control over listed 
ﬁrms: the government’s ultimate control rights are greater than 20% (1) or 50% (2), and 
its direct ownership is greater than 20% (3) or 50% (4). It can be seen that 92.1% of 
ultimate owners have a relatively strong degree of control over listed companies (control 
rights greater than 20%), and 42.1% have absolute control (control rights greater than 
50%). When direct ownership is used as the criterion, the fraction of ﬁrms under sole 
government control is even greater, with the central government more likely than local 
governments to have absolute control. Government control is strongest in the mining 
and transportation industries and weaker in more diversiﬁed sectors. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
Table 5 gives general information on SOE performance. Compared with the 
industry median, SOEs tend to be larger and have higher current, turnover and market 
performance ratios, but lower proﬁt ratios. A t-test on the variance between central and 
local government-controlled ﬁrms shows that the former are signiﬁcantly larger than the 
latter. Firms under central government control also have signiﬁcantly lower degrees of 
leverage and higher proﬁt margins from their core business, as well as higher net proﬁt 
margins and greater ROA, CROA, ROE, CROE and Tobin’s Qs (see Table 1 for variable 
deﬁnitions). 
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Mean Median Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current ratio 0.17 0.00 0.31 0.16 -1.20 -2.7480***
Leverage -2.00% 0.21% -6.00% -4.38% 1.97** 2.2296**
Total assets




4.14 0.61 1.51 0.76 1.62 0.0730
Inventory 
turnover 0.65 0.14 -1.10 -0.18 1.36 1.6620*
Total assets 
turnover 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.09 -1.61 -1.8298*
Proﬁt margin 
from core 
business -9.40% -0.27% -3.10% 0.18% -2.13** -1.3062
Net proﬁt 
margin -12.00% -0.34% -2.60% 0.34% -2.14** -1.2391
ROA -1.40% -0.06% -0.20% 0.38% -2.94*** -2.0256**
CROA -1.20% -0.04% -0.20% 0.06% -2.63*** -1.8421*
CFROA -0.50% 0.17% -1.00% 0.02% -0.2 -0.3757
ROE -10.70% -0.19% -3.40% -0.05% -2.47** -1.4816
CROE -10.50% -0.34% -3.00% -0.04% -2.34** -1.4508
CFROE -0.04% 0.41% -2.30% 0.14% -0.39 0.0006
MB 0.16 -0.10 0.15 0.10 -0.34 -2.1759**
Tobin’s Q1 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.08 -2.09** -2.7974***
Tobin’s Q2 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -1.21 -1.6780*
Note: *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a  This table provides performance information for government-controlled listed firms. All of the variables (except 
Total assets) are industry median-adjusted values. Columns (1) and (3) report the sample means, Column (2) and 
(4) report the sample median. Column (5) and (6) report the results of t-test and Wilcoxon Z-test between ﬁrms 
controlled by the local and central governments, respectively. 
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Tables 6 to 8 present the effects of ultimate control structure on firm value, as 
measured by the market-to-book ratio (MB).9 Our key independent variables include all 
of the decentralization measures: LAYER, measured by the number of ownership layers 
that connect a listed company to a government agency; SSOE, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the direct controlling shareholder is an SSOE or government bureau and 
zero otherwise; OC1, measured by ultimate control rights divided by ultimate cash ﬂow 
rights; OC2, calculated by ultimate control rights minus ultimate cash ﬂow rights; and 
OC3, a dummy variable that equals one if ultimate cash ﬂow rights are less than control 
rights and zero otherwise. 
In addition to these decentralization variables, we also adopt several control variables, 
as follows. BLOCK is a dummy variable that equals one if there is more than one large 
shareholder and zero otherwise. We include this variable to control for the positive 
impact on firm value of the presence of another legal person shareholder or foreign 
investor, which may reduce managerial agency problems. H3, which is calculated by 
the square root of the total squared ownership of the three largest shareholders, is used 
to control for ownership concentration. Although ﬁrms with concentrated ownership 
may have fewer agency problems, they may also suﬀer a greater political burden, as the 
government has more powerful control. Therefore, the coeﬃcient between H3 and ﬁrm 
value is diﬃcult to predict, and we determine it from the empirical results. Finally, we 
also control for ﬁrm age (Age), ﬁrm size (Size) and the leverage ratio (Leverage), all being 
found in prior studies to be correlated with ﬁrm performance. 
We ﬁrst include all sample ﬁrms into the regression (see Table 6). Except for SSOE, 
all of the key independent variables are signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrm value. The coeﬃcient 
between LAYER and firm value is 0.22 and significant at the 1% level; that is, one 
additional layer would improve firm value by 22 percent. The significantly positive 
parameters for OC1, OC2 and OC3 indicate that ﬁrm value is greater when there is 
more separation between the government and the enterprise. As all of these variables 
are proxies for the level of decentralization, which is associated with lower political costs 
and higher agency costs, these results suggest that the former costs are more severe than 
the latter in government-controlled ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm is further separated from the 
government (through a longer control chain or a greater degree of divergence between 
ultimate ownership and control rights), then although the agency costs increase, the 
lower political costs become the dominant eﬀect, and ﬁrm value increases. Table 6 also 
shows leverage and the number of years from the IPO is positively correlated to ﬁrm 
value, and larger ﬁrms to have less value. The shareholding concentration at the direct 
control level is also found to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm performance. 
9 We also measure it by Tobin’s Q, with consistent results. 
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Table 6. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Whole Samplea
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 6.2908*** 6.6742*** 6.8315*** 6.7625***











BLOCK 0.2596 0.0061* 0.0047 0.0055*
(1.38) (1.83) (1.40) (1.66)
H3 0.0053 0.3413** 0.3840** 0.3536**
(1.61) (2.09) (2.33) (2.20)
Age 0.0361** 0.0357** 0.0368** 0.0356**
(2.00) (1.98) (2.02) (1.97)
Size -0.3528*** -0.3649*** -0.3701*** -0.3636***
(-7.00) (-7.24) (-7.28) (-7.21)
Leverage 0.7639*** 0.8840*** 0.9060*** 0.7493***
(3.36) (3.84) (3.90) (3.29)
Adj_R2 0.0967 0.1121 0.0973 0.0888
F 12.01*** 15.71*** 13.56*** 12.72***
Observations 889 820 820 820
Note: *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t statistics are in parentheses.
a  This table reports the eﬀects of ownership structure on ﬁrm performance, as measured by MB. The sample includes all 
ﬁrms with non-persons as the ultimate owner (ﬁrms in the ﬁnance industry are excluded). All of the variables except 
for LAYER and SSOE are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
In Tables 7 and 8, we present the eﬀects on ﬁrm value of ultimate control structure in 
our subsamples of local government-controlled ﬁrms and central government-controlled 
firms, respectively. Consistent with our prediction and the results presented in Table 
6, we ﬁnd that in the latter, ﬁrm value increases with the extent of decentralization. 
However, this is not the case for central government-controlled firms, in which 
further decentralization fails to improve firm performance. These findings confirm 
our understanding that the central government engages in less political intervention 
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in the ﬁrms under its control. Moreover, there is, on average, a longer control chain 
between the central government and the SOEs under its control than is the case with 
local government-controlled ﬁrms, which suggests that reduced political costs do not 
sufficiently compensate for increased agency costs in central government-controlled 
ﬁrms. In other words, decentralization is more successful in local government-controlled 
ﬁrms. 
Table 7. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Local Government-Controlled SOEsa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 7.1609*** 7.2547*** 7.4239*** 7.5656***











BLOCK 0.2480 0.0026 0.0011 0.0023
(1.08) (0.69) (0.29) (0.61)
H3 0.0027 0.4054** 0.4413** 0.4135**
(0.72) (2.23) (2.41) (2.34)
Age 0.0266 0.0278 0.0281 0.0265
(1.32) (1.37) (1.37) (1.31)
Size -0.3895*** -0.3809*** -0.3864*** -0.3935***
(-6.42) (-6.23) (-6.27) (-6.48)
Leverage 0.6543** 0.6162** 0.6336** 0.6321**
(2.47) (2.33) (2.38) (2.38)
Adj_R2 0.1022 0.1114 0.0959 0.1287
F 9.80*** 11.90*** 10.23*** 5.33***
Observations 670 626 626 626
Note: *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The T statistics are in parentheses.
a  This table reports the eﬀects of ownership structure on ﬁrm performance, as measured by MB. The sample includes 
all ﬁrms with a local SAMB or local government bureau as the ultimate owner (ﬁrms in the ﬁnance industry are 
excluded). All of the variables except for LAYER and SSOE are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
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Table 8. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Central Government-Controlled SOEsa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 6.3438*** 6.5986*** 6.6567*** 5.5038***











BLOCK 0.1246 0.0141** 0.0133* 0.0132*
(0.33) (2.02) (1.92) (1.84)
H3 0.0135* 0.1380 0.2125 0.1902
(1.89) (0.38) (0.57) (0.50)
Age 0.0686* 0.0726* 0.0747* 0.0813**
(1.72) (1.88) (1.94) (2.03)
Size -0.3180*** -0.3916*** -0.3929*** -0.3258***
(-3.37) (-4.25) (-4.26) (-3.48)
Leverage 1.0149** 1.7603*** 1.7619*** 1.0608**
(2.25) (3.71) (3.70) (2.34)
Adj_R2 0.0886 0.1332 0.0952 0.0774
F 3.47*** 5.51*** 10.51*** 3.59***
Observations 219 194 194 194
Note: *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t statistics are in parentheses.
a  This table reports the eﬀects of ownership structure on ﬁrm performance, as measured by MB. The sample includes all 
ﬁrms with a central SAMB or central government bureau as the ultimate owner (ﬁrms in the ﬁnance industry are 
excluded). All of the variables except for LAYER and SSOE are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
6. Conclusions 
This study documents the ultimate control structures of state-owned listed companies 
in China. We ﬁnd that more than 70% of these ﬁrms are ultimately owned by the state 
and controlled by local governments or branches of the central government. In line with 
the evidence reported in La Porta et al. (1999) on the structures of state-owned ﬁrms, we 
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show that the State holds listed companies directly or indirectly through a control chain. 
Our results also indicate that the degree of divergence between cash flow rights and 
government control rights is insigniﬁcant and that the State strengthens its control over 
listed ﬁrms by reducing the length of the control chain or by employing SSOEs as the 
immediate shareholders. 
Consistent with Qian (1996), we take both political costs and agency costs into 
account to explain the impact of ultimate control structures on ﬁrm value. Compared 
with previous studies, which generally consider only one of these costs, this approach 
allows us to interpret the relationship between firm value and ownership structure 
more fully. We ﬁnd that, in general, ﬁrms perform better when there is a greater degree 
of separation from government. This is particularly true of firms controlled by local 
governments. Thus, we conclude that local governments should devolve more control 
rights to corporate insiders to improve ﬁrm eﬃciency. 
This paper has implications for state enterprise reform in developing countries. 
Although the governments in these countries will most likely retain a substantial degree 
of control over listed companies, we demonstrate the importance of identifying the most 
eﬃcient type of control structure and show that greater decentralization usually improves 
ﬁrm performance. 
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